Author: Immanuel Kant
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date: 1999-02-28
This entirely new translation of Critique of Pure Reason is the most accurate and informative English translation ever produced of this epochal philosophical text. Though its simple and direct style will make it suitable for all new readers of Kant, the translation displays an unprecedented philosophical and textual sophistication that will enlighten Kant scholars as well. This translation recreates as far as possible a text with the same interpretative nuances and richness as the original. The extensive editorial apparatus includes informative annotation, detailed glossaries, an index, and a large-scale general introduction in which two of the world's preeminent Kant scholars provide both a succinct summary of the structure and argument of the Critique and a detailed account of its long and complex genesis.
Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most rewarding of all philosophical works. The text follows the second edition of 1787, with a translation of all first edition passages altered or omitted. For this reissue of Kemp Smith's classic 1929 edition, Gary Banham contributes a major new Bibliography of secondary sources on Kant.
This thoughtful abridgment makes an ideal introduction to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Key selections include: the Preface in B, the Introduction, the Transcendental Aesthetic, the Second Analogy, the Refutation of Idealism, the first three Antinomies, the Transcendental Deduction in B, and the Canon of Pure Reason. A brief introduction provides biographical information, descriptions of the nature of Kant's project and of how each major section of the Critique contributes to that project. A select bibliography and index are also included.
Originally published in 1929. PREFACE: THE present translation was begun in 1913, when I was completing my Commentary to Kants Critique of Pure Reason Owing, however, to various causes, I was unable at that time to do more than prepare a rough translation of about a third of the whole and it was not until 1927 that I found leisure to revise and continue it. In this task I have greatly profited by the work of my two predecessors, J. M. D. Meiklejohn and Max Muller. Meiklejohn's work, a translation of the second edition of the Critique was published in 1855. Max Mullers translation, which is based on the first edition of the Critique, with the second edition passages in appendices, was published in 1881. Meiklejohn has a happy gift which only those who attempt to follow in his steps can, I think, fully appreciate of making Kant speak in language that reasonably approximates to English idiom. Max Mullers main merit, as he has very justly claimed, is his greater accuracy in rendering passages in which a specially exact appreciation of the niceties of German idiom happens to be important for the sense. Both Meiklejohn and Max Muller laboured, however, under the disadvantage of not having made any very thorough study of the Critical Philosophy and the shortcomings in their translations can usually be traced to this cause. In the past fifty years, also, much has been done in the study and interpretation of the text. In particular, my task has been facilitated by the quite invaluable edition of the Critique edited by Dr. Raymund Schmidt. Indeed, the appearance of this edition in 1926 was the immediate occasion of my resuming the work of translation. Dr. Schmidts restoration of the original texts of the first and second editions of the Critique, and especially of Kants own punctuation so very helpful in many difficult and doubtful passages and his citation of alternative readings, have largely relieved me of the time-consuming task of collating texts, and of assembling the emendations suggested by Kantian scholars in their editions of the Critique or in their writings upon it. The text which I have followed is that of the second edition (1787) and I have in all cases indicated any departure from it. I have also given a translation of all first edition passages which in the second edition have been either altered or omitted. Wherever possible, this original first edition text is given in the lower part of the page. In the two sections, however, which Kant completely recast in the second edition The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories and The Paralogisms of Pure Reason this cannot conveniently be done and I have therefore given the two versions in immediate succession, in the main text. For this somewhat unusual procedure there is a twofold justification first, that the Critique is already, in itself, a composite work, the different parts of which record the successive stages in the development of Kants views and secondly, that the first edition versions are, as a matter of fact, indispensable for an adequate under standing of the versions which were substituted for them. The paging's of both the first and the second edition are given throughout, on the margins the first edition being referred to as A, the second edition as B.
This eBook edition of "The Critique of Pure Reason" has been formatted to the highest digital standards and adjusted for readability on all devices. The Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most influential works in the history of philosophy and marks a turning point and the beginning of modern philosophy. Also referred to as Kant's "first critique," it was followed by the Critique of Practical Reason and by the Critique of Judgment. In the preface to the first edition, Kant explains what he means by a critique of pure reason: "I do not mean by this a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience." Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) was a German philosopher, who, according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is "the central figure of modern philosophy." Kant argued that fundamental concepts of the human mind structure human experience, that reason is the source of morality, that aesthetics arises from a faculty of disinterested judgment, that space and time are forms of our understanding, and that the world as it is "in-itself" is unknowable. Kant took himself to have effected a Copernican revolution in philosophy, akin to Copernicus' reversal of the age-old belief that the sun revolved around the earth.
Author: Immanuel Kant
Release Date: 2017-01-01
The Critique of Pure Reason (German: Kritik der reinen Vernunft, KrV) by Immanuel Kant, (first published in 1781, second edition 1787), is one of the most influential works in the history of philosophy. Also referred to as Kant's First Critique, it was followed by the Critique of Practical Reason (1788) and the Critique of Judgment (1790). In the preface to the first edition Kant explains what he means by a critique of pure reason: "I do not mean by this a critique of books and systems, but of the faculty of reason in general, in respect of all knowledge after which it may strive independently of all experience." Dealing with questions concerning the foundations and extent of human knowledge, Kant builds on the work of empiricist philosophers such as John Locke and David Hume, as well as taking into account the theories of rationalist philosophers such as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff. Kant expounds new ideas on the nature of space and time, and claims to solve the problem which Hume posed regarding human knowledge of the relation of cause and effect, and to have assessed the ability of the human mind to engage in metaphysics.Knowledge independent of experience is referred to by Kant as "a priori" knowledge, while knowledge obtained through experience is termed "a posteriori". According to Kant, "a priori" knowledge expresses necessary truths. Statements which are necessarily true cannot be negated without becoming false. Examples provided by Kant include the propositions of mathematics, propositions "from the understanding in its quite ordinary employment", such as "Every alteration must have a cause", as well as propositions from "natural science (physics)", such as "in all changes in the material world the quantity of matter remains unchanged".Kant believed that he had discovered another attribute of propositions, which allowed him to frame the problem of a priori knowledge in a new way: the distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" judgments. According to Kant, to say that a sentence is "analytic" is to say that what is stated in the predicate-concept of the sentence is already contained (albeit covertly) in the subject-concept of that sentence. The example he provides is the sentence, "All bodies are extended", which is "analytic" since the predicate-concept ("extended") is already contained in-or "thought in"-the subject-concept of the sentence ("bodies"). Kant considered the judgment, "All bodies are heavy" synthetic, since "I do not include in the concept of body in general the predicate 'weight'". Synthetic judgments therefore add something to a concept, whereas analytic judgments only explain what is already contained in the concept.The distinctive character of "analytic" judgments was therefore that they can be known to be true simply by an analysis of the concepts contained in them-or, alternatively, are true by definition. Prior to Kant, it was thought that all necessary truth had the character of being "analytic". Kant argued that not all necessary truths are analytic, but that some of them are synthetic. Having explained that the basis of analytic judgments lies in the principle of contradiction, (or the principle of identity), the task he set out to achieve in the Critique of Pure Reason was to explain the grounds of those judgments which are necessary and synthetic-and these he termed "a priori synthetic judgments".
Kants „Kritik der praktischen Vernunft“ (1788) steht zu Unrecht oft im Schatten der „Kritik der reinen Vernunft“ und der „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten“. Tatsächlich sind die Grundelemente der Kantischen Moralphilosophie im Gegensatz zu vielen Thesen der ersten Kritik bis heute weitgehend anerkannt, und erst der Nachweis der zweiten Kritik, dass Freiheit wirklich ist, macht „den Schlussstein von dem ganzen Gebäude eines Systems der reinen, selbst der spekulativen Vernunft aus“. Entlang der Stichworte reiner Wille, gesetzgebende Form der Maxime, transzendentale Freiheit, Autonomie und Faktum der Vernunft zweigt Kant in der „Analytik“, dass reine Vernunft „für sich“ praktisch sein, nämlich den Willen bestimmen kann. Die „Dialektik“ sichert den Ideen von der Existenz Gottes und der Unsterblichkeit der Seele objektive Realität und untersucht das Verhältnis von theoretischer und praktischer Vernunft. Die „Methodenlehre“ schließlich skizziert eine Theorie moralischer Erziehung, die für den heutigen Ethikunterricht noch aktuell ist. Die zwölf Beiträge dieses kooperativen Kommentars rekonstruieren die Argumente eines Schlüsseltextes der Moralphilosophie und prüfen die sachliche Überzeugungskraft.