Game Theory

Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262061414
Release Date: 1991
Genre: Business & Economics

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory -including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games ofincomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with thebroad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any givenpoint. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises.The theoryof noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimalchoice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices thatare based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to manyfields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in thestudy of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteenchapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games ofcomplete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incompleteinformation, and advanced topics.Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole are Professors of Economics atMIT.

The Theory of Learning in Games

Author: Drew Fudenberg
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262061945
Release Date: 1998
Genre: Business & Economics

This work explains that equilibrium is the long-run outcome of a process in which non-fully rational players search for optimality over time. The models they e×plore provide a foundation for equilibrium theory and suggest ways for economists to evaluate and modify traditional equilibrium concepts.

Strategies and Games

Author: Prajit K. Dutta
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262041693
Release Date: 1999
Genre: Mathematics

Game theory has become increasingly popular among undergraduate as well as business school students. This text is the first to provide both a complete theoretical treatment of the subject and a variety of real-world applications, primarily in economics, but also in business, political science, and the law. Strategies and Games grew out of Prajit Dutta's experience teaching a course in game theory over the last six years at Columbia University.The book is divided into three parts: Strategic Form Games and Their Applications, Extensive Form Games and Their Applications, and Asymmetric Information Games and Their Applications. The theoretical topics include dominance solutions, Nash equilibrium, backward induction, subgame perfect equilibrium, repeated games, dynamic games, Bayes-Nash equilibrium, mechanism design, auction theory, and signaling. An appendix presents a thorough discussion of single-agent decision theory, as well as the optimization and probability theory required for the course.Every chapter that introduces a new theoretical concept opens with examples and ends with a case study. Case studies include Global Warming and the Internet, Poison Pills, Treasury Bill Auctions, and Final Jeopardy. Each part of the book also contains several chapter-length applications including Bankruptcy Law, the NASDAQ market, OPEC, and the Commons problem. This is also the first text to provide a detailed analysis of dynamic strategic interaction.

A Course in Game Theory

Author: Martin J. Osborne
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262650401
Release Date: 1994
Genre: Business & Economics

Presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts.

Meaningful Games

Author: Robin Clark
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262297868
Release Date: 2011-11-18
Genre: Language Arts & Disciplines

In Meaningful Games, Robin Clark explains in an accessible manner the usefulness of game theory in thinking about a wide range of issues in linguistics. Clark argues that we use grammar strategically to signal our intended meanings: our choices as speaker are conditioned by what choices the hearer will make interpreting what we say. Game theory -- according to which the outcome of a decision depends on the choices of others -- provides a formal system that allows us to develop theories about the kind of decision making that is crucial to understanding linguistic behavior.Clark argues the only way to understand meaning is to grapple with its social nature -- that it is the social that gives content to our mental lives. Game theory gives us a framework for working out these ideas. The resulting theory of use will allow us to account for many aspects of linguistic meaning, and the grammar itself can be simplified. The results are nevertheless precise and subject to empirical testing.Meaningful Games offers an engaging and accessible introduction to game theory and the study of linguistic meaning. No knowledge of mathematics beyond simple algebra is required; formal definitions appear in special boxes outside the main text. The book includes an extended argument in favor of the social basis of meaning; a brief introduction to game theory, with a focus on coordination games and cooperation; discussions of common knowledge and games of partial information; models of games for pronouns and politeness; and the development of a system of social coordination of reference.

Evolutionary Game Theory

Author: Jörgen W. Weibull
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262731215
Release Date: 1997
Genre: Mathematics

This text introduces current evolutionary game theory -- where ideas from evolutionary biology and rationalistic economics meet -- emphasizing the links between static and dynamic approaches and noncooperative game theory. Much of the text is devoted to the key concepts of evolutionary stability and replicator dynamics. The former highlights the role of mutations and the latter the mechanisms of selection. Moreover, set-valued static and dynamic stability concepts, as well as processes of social evolution, are discussed. Separate background chapters are devoted to noncooperative game theory and the theory of ordinary differential equations. There are examples throughout as well as individual chapter summaries. Because evolutionary game theory is a fast-moving field that is itself branching out and rapidly evolving, Jörgen Weibull has judiciously focused on clarifying and explaining core elements of the theory in an up-to-date, comprehensive, and self-contained treatment. The result is a text for second-year graduate students in economic theory, other social sciences, and evolutionary biology. The book goes beyond filling the gap between texts by Maynard-Smith and Hofbauer and Sigmund that are currently being used in the field. Evolutionary Game Theory will also serve as an introduction for those embarking on research in this area as well as a reference for those already familiar with the field. Weibull provides an overview of the developments that have taken place in this branch of game theory, discusses the mathematical tools needed to understand the area, describes both the motivation and intuition for the concepts involved, and explains why and how it is relevant to economics.

Biblical Games

Author: Steven J. Brams
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262523329
Release Date: 1980
Genre: Mathematics

BACK IN PRINT with a new preface and a new chapter

Logic in Games

Author: Johan van Benthem
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262019903
Release Date: 2014-01-24
Genre: Computers

A comprehensive examination of the interfaces of logic, computer science, and game theory, drawing on twenty years of research on logic and games.

Frontiers of Game Theory

Author: K. G. Binmore
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 0262023563
Release Date: 1993
Genre: Business & Economics

seventeen contributions reflecting the many diverse approaches in the field today

Characteristics of Games

Author: George Skaff Elias
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262017138
Release Date: 2012-08-24
Genre: Games & Activities

Characteristics of Games offers a new way to understand games: by focusing on certain traits -- including number of players, rules, degrees of luck and skill needed, and reward/effort ratio -- and using these characteristics as basic points of comparison and analysis. These issues are often discussed by game players and designers but seldom written about in any formal way. This book fills that gap. By emphasizing these player-centric basic concepts, the book provides a framework for game analysis from the viewpoint of a game designer. The book shows what all genres of games -- board games, card games, computer games, and sports -- have to teach each other. Today's game designers may find solutions to design problems when they look at classic games that have evolved over years of playing. Characteristics of Games -- written by three of the most prominent game designers working today -- will serve as an essential reference for game designers and game players curious about the inner workings of games. It includes exercises (which can also serve as the basis for discussions) and examples chosen from a wide variety of games. There are occasional mathematical digressions, but these can be skipped with no loss of continuity. Appendixes offer supplementary material, including a brief survey of the two main branches of mathematical game theory and a descriptive listing of each game referred to in the text.

A Primer on Auction Design Management and Strategy

Author: David J. Salant
Publisher: MIT Press
ISBN: 9780262028264
Release Date: 2014-12-26
Genre: Business & Economics

Auctions are highly structured market transactions primarily used in thin markets (markets with few participants and infrequent transactions). In auctions, unlike most other markets, offers and counteroffers are typically made within a structure defined by a set of rigid and comprehensive rules. Because auctions are essentially complex negotiations that occur within a fully defined and rigid set of rules, they can be analyzed by game theoretic models more accurately and completely than can most other types of market transactions.This book offers a guide for modeling, analyzing, and predicting the outcomes of auctions, focusing on the application of game theory and auction theory to real-world auction design and decision making. After a brief introduction to fundamental concepts from game theory, the book explains some of the more significant results from the auction theory literature, including the revenue (or payoff) equivalence theorem, the winner's curse, and optimal auction design. Chapters on auction practice follow, addressing collusion, competition, information disclosure, and other basic principles of auction management, with some discussion of auction experiments and simulations. Finally, the book covers auction experience, with most of the discussion centered on energy and telecommunications auctions, which have become the proving ground for many new auction designs. A clear and concise introduction to auctions, auction design, and auction strategy, this Primer will be an essential resource for students, researchers, and practitioners.

Game Theory for Applied Economists

Author: Robert Gibbons
Publisher: Princeton University Press
ISBN: 1400835887
Release Date: 1992-07-13
Genre: Business & Economics

This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works overly abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building--of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.