Author: Williamson R. Murray
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date: 1998-08-13
In 1914, the armies and navies that faced each other were alike right down to the strengths of their companies and battalions and the designs of their battleships and cruisers. Differences were of degree rather than essence. During the interwar period, however, the armed forces grew increasingly asymmetrical, developing different approaches to the same problems. This 1996 study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in exploitation by the seven major military powers. The comparative essays investigate how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explain much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II. The essays focus on several instances of how military services developed new technology and weapons and incorporated them into their doctrine, organisation and styles of operations.
Author: Allan R. Millett
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date: 2010-08-09
This three-volume study examines the questions raised by the performance of the military institutions of France, Germany, Russia, the United States, Great Britain, Japan and Italy in the period from 1914 to 1945. Leading military historians deal with the different national approaches to war and military power at the tactical, operational, strategic, and political levels. They form the basis for a fundamental re-examination of how military organizations have performed in the first half of the twentieth century. Volume 2 covers the interwar period. Volumes 1 and 3 address World War I and World War II, respectively. Now in a new edition, with a new introduction by the editors, these classic volumes will remain invaluable for military historians and social scientists in their examination of national security and military issues. They will also be essential reading for future military leaders at Staff and War Colleges.
Author: Thomas G. Mahnken
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Release Date: 2002
Using formerly classified sources - in particular, the reports of military attaches and other diplomat-officers - Thomas G. Mahnken sheds light on the shadowy world of U.S. intelligence gathering, tracing how America learned of military developments in Japan, Germany, and Great Britain in the period between the two world wars. The interwar period witnessed both a considerable shift in the balance of power in Europe and Asia and the emergence of new ways of war, such as carrier aviation, amphibious operations, and combined-arms armored warfare. American attempts to follow these developments, Mahnken says, illustrate the problems that intelligence organizations face in their efforts to bridge the gulf between prewar expectations and wartime reality. He finds three reasons for intelligence's relative lack of success: intelligence agencies are more inclined to monitor established weapons systems than to search for new ones; their attention is more likely to focus on technology and doctrine already demonstrated in combat; and they have more success identifying innovation in areas their own country is testing.
Author: Dima Adamsky
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Release Date: 2010-01-27
Genre: Political Science
This book studies the impact of cultural factors on the course of military innovations. One would expect that countries accustomed to similar technologies would undergo analogous changes in their perception of and approach to warfare. However, the intellectual history of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in Russia, the US, and Israel indicates the opposite. The US developed technology and weaponry for about a decade without reconceptualizing the existing paradigm about the nature of warfare. Soviet 'new theory of victory' represented a conceptualization which chronologically preceded technological procurement. Israel was the first to utilize the weaponry on the battlefield, but was the last to develop a conceptual framework that acknowledged its revolutionary implications. Utilizing primary sources that had previously been completely inaccessible, and borrowing methods of analysis from political science, history, anthropology, and cognitive psychology, this book suggests a cultural explanation for this puzzling transformation in warfare. The Culture of Military Innovation offers a systematic, thorough, and unique analytical approach that may well be applicable in other perplexing strategic situations. Though framed in the context of specific historical experience, the insights of this book reveal important implications related to conventional, subconventional, and nonconventional security issues. It is therefore an ideal reference work for practitioners, scholars, teachers, and students of security studies.
Author: John T. Kuehn
Publisher: Naval Institute Press
Release Date: 2013-07-10
The author examines the influence of the General Board of the U.S. Navy as an agent of innovation in the years between the world wars. A formal body established by the secretary of the Navy, the General Board served as the organizational nexus for the interaction between fleet design and the naval limitations imposed on the Navy by treaty. Particularly important, Kuehn argues, was the Board's role in implementing the Washington Naval Treaty, which limited naval armaments after 1922. Kuehn explains that the leadership of the Navy at large and the General Board in particular felt themselves especially constrained by Article XIX of the Washington Naval Treaty, which implemented a status quo on naval fortifications in the western Pacific.
Author: Williamson Murray
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date: 2011-09-30
This collection of articles represents Professor Williamson Murray's efforts to elucidate the role that history should play in thinking about both the present and the future. They reflect three disparate themes in Professor Murray's work: his deep fascination with history and those who have acted in the past; his fascination with the similarities in human behavior between the past and the present; and his belief that the study of military and strategic history can be of real use to those who will confront the daunting problems of war and peace in the twenty-first century. The first group of essays addresses the relevance of history to an understanding of the present and to an understanding of the possibilities of the future. The second addresses the possible direct uses of history to think through the problems involved in the creation of effective military institutions. The final group represents historical case studies that serve to illuminate the present.
The first aircraft flew in 1903 and within ten years had been developed into military weapons.From World War I to World War II, pilots became exalted national heroes, gallant knights astride their iron steeds high above the skies of Europe. Far from the heroic fantasy, however, most pilots and aircrews struggled against grim odds, fighting out their frequently short lives with bravado and recklessness. This vivid account explores the conditions in which these pilots fought and the rise of air warfare to preeminence, culminating in the Enola Gay's fateful drop of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The early flying machines of World War I and the pilots who braved hostile skies The rise of airplane technology in the 1930s -- radar, blind-bombing devices, radio control, and the increased speed of new monoplane designs The contribution of Allied air power to the defeat of Nazi Germany, Raids on Japan, the drop of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, and the beginning of a new era of warfare
Author: Herman Amersfoort
Release Date: 2011-04-11
In the period 1900-1940 the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland reacted in divergent ways to the same foreign military threats. This volume argues that their internal politics and politico-military strategic culture are vital keys to understanding those differences.
This book explains how the US military reacted to the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), and failed to innovate its organization or doctrine to match the technological breakthroughs it brought about. Many called for the transformation of the US military in the years after the end of the Cold War, seeking the changes in organization and doctrine that would complete the RMA innovation and a commitment to counter-insurgency, peace keeping and nation building missions. This volume describes the origins, uses, and limits of the RMA technologies, examines how each of the five US armed services (categorising the Special Operations as a separate service) made their adjustments both to the technologies and the use of force, and how the role of the civilian officials and the defense industry altered in this process of change and avoidance of change. The book examines the internal politics of the services as well as civil/military relations to identify the external pressures on the services for significant change in their doctrine and weapons. Many have noted the failure of the services to innovate in what can be called the 'Second Inter-war Period' (the years after the Cold War). This book offers explanations for this failure and arguments about the possible range and desirability of military innovation in the post-Cold war era. This book will be of great interest to students of strategic studies, US defence politics, military studies, and US politics. Harvey M. Sapolsky is Professor of Public Policy and Organization in the Department of Political Science at MIT and former Director of the Security Studies Program. Benjamin H. Friedman is a Research Fellow in Defense and Homeland Security Studies at the Cato Institute and a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at MIT. Brendan Green is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at MIT and an affiliate of the Security Studies Program.
Author: Stephen Morillo
Publisher: John Wiley & Sons
Release Date: 2013-04-03
This clear, readable introduction to the popular field of military history is now available in a refreshed and updated second edition. It shows that military history encompasses not just accounts of campaigns and battles but includes a wide range of perspectives on all aspects of past military organization and activity. In concise chapters it explains the fundamental features of the field, including: The history of military history, showing how it has developed from ancient times to the present; The key ideas and concepts that shape analysis of military activity; it argues that military history is as methodologically and philosophically sophisticated as any field of history; The current controversies about which military historians argue, and why they are important; A survey of who does military history, where it is taught and published, and how it is practiced; A look at where military history is headed in the future. The new edition of What is Military History? provides an up-to-date bibliography and cutting edge new case studies, including counterinsurgency, and as such continues to be ideal for classes in military history and in historiography generally, as well as for anyone interested in learning more about the dynamics of a rich and growing area of study.
The President, Secretary of Defense, and the Army's Chief of Staff have all stated that the United States is a "Nation at War." This fundamental fact is key to what we do at the U.S. Army War College. Because of our continued emphasis on the Global War on Terrorism, we face significant strategic challenges as we continue to transform the force, improve interagency integration into joint operations, and, all the while, engage in active combat operations. This collection of outstanding essays