Author: Imani Perry
Release Date: 2018-09-14
Genre: Family & Relationships
Imani Perry recenters patriarchy to contemporary discussions of feminism through a social and literary analysis of cultural artifacts--ranging from nineteenth-century slavery court cases and historical vignettes to literature and contemporary art--from the Enlightenment to the present.
Author: Jean-François Mertens
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Release Date: 2015-02-02
Genre: Business & Economics
Three leading experts have produced a landmark work based on a set of working papers published by the Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1994 under the title 'Repeated Games', which holds almost mythic status among game theorists. Jean-François Mertens, Sylvain Sorin and Shmuel Zamir have significantly elevated the clarity and depth of presentation with many results presented at a level of generality that goes far beyond the original papers - many written by the authors themselves. Numerous results are new, and many classic results and examples are not to be found elsewhere. Most remain state of the art in the literature. This book is full of challenging and important problems that are set up as exercises, with detailed hints provided for their solutions. A new bibliography traces the development of the core concepts up to the present day.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 13th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms, ESA 2005, held in Palma de Mallorca, Spain, in September 2005 in the context of the combined conference ALGO 2005. The 75 revised full papers presented together with abstracts of 3 invited lectures were carefully reviewed and selected from 244 submissions. The papers address all current issues in algorithmics reaching from design and mathematical issues over real-world applications in various fields up to engineering and analysis of algorithms.
Author: Robert J. Aumann
Publisher: MIT Press
Release Date: 1995
Genre: Business & Economics
Winner, Frederick W. Lanchester Prize given by The Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS), 1995. During the height of the Cold War, between 1965 and 1968, Robert Aumann, Michael Maschler, and Richard Stearns collaborated on research on the dynamics of arms control negotiations that has since become foundational to work on repeated games. These five seminal papers are collected here for the first time, with the addition of "postscripts" describing many of the developments since the papers were written. The basic model studied throughout the book is one in which players ignorant about the game being played must learn what they can from the actions of the others. The original work, done under contract to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, was intended to tackle the gradual disarmament problem, in which neither player knew what his own payoff would be for any given agreement, because of uncertainty about the other side's arsenal and weapons production technology. But the research soon became much more generalized, covering information concealment and revelation, signaling and learning, and related ideas in any repeated competitive situation. The first four chapters of the book treat the competitive zero-sum side of the theory of repeated games. Chapter five takes up cooperative phenomena where one player may want to signal information to another. An extensive bibliography covers all items mentioned in the main text, in the postscripts, and in the introduction. The bibliography also includes a compilation of published papers and books that refer to the original reports.
Release Date: 1999
Genre: New England
Edward Messenger was born in 1617 in England. He and his brothers with their parents came to New England and settled in the colony of Connecticut. He married Dorcas ? in 1650. Edward died 12 May 1688 in Bloomfield, Connecticut.